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Introduction 
The political significance of the Scottish rating revaluation of 1985 was 
that of a catalyst for change. The Government had come under increasing 
internal pressure (i.e. from its own supporters) in 1984, some simply 
protesting about the growth of rate bills and the political consequences of 
that for the Conservatives, others concerned about the inability of the 
Government's control system to discriminate between 'prudent' and 
'profligate' authorities. (I) The impact of revaluation was to increase 
demands from conservative groups for reform. Although much was made 
in the media of widespread public dissatisfaction, in our view the pressure 
was confined to a small but vociferous and active number of pressure 
groups, both of the ratepayer and business variety. For example, in 
Lothian, only around 5% of domestic ratepayers challenged their new 
assessments. This is certainly an increase from the 3% of 1978, but when 
one takes into account the change in incidence of taxation from non-
domestic to domestic, it is hardly evidence of widespread discontent. 
Moreover, although the non-domestic sector benefited as a whole from the 
changeover, there were some dramatic individual increases. Non-domestic 
ratepayers appeals by contrast rose from 19% to 25% in 1985. <2l 
Yet the impression given in the media was of a nation in revolt. In part, 
this is because of the general misconception that revaluation will be to the 
detriment of all ratepayers. A more accurate picture would be of a minority 
in revolt. Those who were gaining had no reason to. 
The search for an alternative system of local government finance 
began in the Conservative Government's first term. This focussed on 
domestic property and in January 1982, the Secretary of State announced 
that the revaluation due to be held in 1983 would apply to non-domestic 
property only, the intention being not to have a domestic revaluation whilst 
the future of the domestic rating system was being considered. 
Following strong representations by the Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities and others that this would create anomalies, the Government 
decided to defer the revaluation completely for two years. Some 
commentators interpreted this decision as reflecting the expectation that 
revaluation would have adverse electoral consequences for the 
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Government. The revaluation postponement aroused no great political 
opposition. One senior official voiced to us the view that this is only because 
"- revaluation is used as a political whipping-boy, the convenient raw 
material for the making of political capital, and all political parties are 
guilty in this respect. It is my view that the real reason was that a partial 
revaluation was administratively impossible". 
By the late summer of 1984, early indications of the likely effects of 
revaluation were available. By October, a report of the Distribution 
Committee of the Working Party on Local Government Finance 
recommended an increase in the domestic element of the Rate Support 
Grant, which would mitigate the effects of revaluation on domestic 
ratepayers. Government ministers took a series of interim measures to 
ameliorate the effect of revaluation. 
In December, 1984, the Minister announced that Industrial Derating 
was reduced from 50% to 40%, and increased the domestic element of the 
rate support grant from 1p to 5p in the pound (on the new valuation). 
Thereafter protests grew, both within the Conservative party and amongst 
its natural supporters, owner-occupiers and sections of the business 
community. Early in 1985, the Government made it clear that revaluation 
would not be postponed, and in February announced a further increase in 
domestic rate relief to 8p in the pound, the equivalent of about £1 per week 
per household. 
This second subsidy was achieved by generating savings in other 
elements of the Scottish Office expenditure block, namely regional aid, 
roads and transport, prisons, health and housing. The total now consumed 
by Domestic Rate Relief was £102 millions, compared to £14.3 millions in 
1984-5. The final stage in the process was responding to the pressure from 
the small business sector. Whilst the overall effect of revaluation was 
broadly neutral on the commercial sector, within that category 
considerable variation in the revaluation factor occurred. So the Scottish 
Office had a strong political card to play and managed to obtain concessions 
from the Treasury out of the Contingency Fund. The sum of £50 million was 
allocated for further rebates for those whose valuation had increased at 
least threefold (in contrast to the national 2.3 times increase) with an 
individual limit of £10,000 placed on this particular subsidy. The special 
legislation to allow this was assisted by opposition parties in Parliament. 
It should not be assumed, however, that these adjustments were 
painless. There is some evidence that the reduction in industrial derating 
caused hardship to some small industrialists. Moreover, the increase in the 
domestic element of the rate support grant reduced the amounts available 
for the needs and resources element. That is, it redistributed grant income 
away from poorer, needier areas, to wealthier ones. Finally, these changes 
denied industry the full benefits of revaluation. These changes we suspect 
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will be temporary, and a gradual reduction of the domestic relief will take 
place. (It was reduced to 7p in the current year). 
Revaluation in Scotland gave an additional impetus to the 
Government's efforts to find an alternative to the rating system. Indeed, 
revaluation was presented in the latest Green Paper as providing further 
evidence of the unfairness and unacceptability in the rating system (Scottish 
Office 1986). Whilst we are sceptical ofthis view, we have little doubt that, 
combined with the reduction in the rate support grant, and the budget 
conflict in Edinburgh, it strengthened Ministers' resolve to find a politically 
acceptable alternative. We shall address some of these issues later, but at 
this point, an account of the mechanics of the system is necessary, for it 
became clear that even active lobbyists are confused over how the system 
works. 
The basis of domestic rates is a valuation placed by the Assessor on 
rateable value, and that valuation is an estimate of the rent at which a 
property might reasonably be expected to be let for a one year period with a 
reasonable expectation of continuance (based on the contractor principle). 
It is based on a survey of the property market, rental evidence, and some 
other general factors. Thomson(3) lists these as the age, degree of 
attachment, construction, amenity and quality of a house. 
The Assessor enters properties in the Valuation Roll showing annual 
value. In the case of domestic properties these are valued to a Gross Annual 
Value, and a statutory allowance is deducted to cover the upkeep of the 
property to arrive at Net Annual Value. All other subjects are valued direct 
to Net Annual Value. 
The amount of rates payable by each ratepayer is determined by the 
rateable value of the property multiplied by the Regional and District 
Rates. The combined rate is reduced by a statutorily determined sum (7p 
per£ of Rateable Value in 1986-7) for domestic ratepayers. People on low 
incomes have their rates taken into account in a system of housing benefits, 
and therefore treated as part of their housing costs. Domestic water rates 
are levied separately, but paid with the rate payments. 
Given the basis of the rating system, it is clear that frequent 
revaluations are necessary. In this respect, we are in full agreement with the 
former Scottish Secretary, George Younger, who told the House of 
Commons, 
"It is the precise purpose of having a revaluation to reflect changes in 
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values both upwards and downwards. It was never the purpose to 
ensure that nobody had ,an increase and nobody had a reduction. 
That would merely perpetuate the unfairness which revaluation is 
designed to reduce." 
The changes in liability are the consequence of valuation from rental. 
In Scotland, house rentals have moved upwards in steady progression for 
the past twenty years. Levels depend very much upon public authority 
housing and on rents set by Rent Assessment Committees and Rent 
Officers. However, the industrial and commercial sector are more sensitive 
to changes in the economic climate. Industrial depression causes industrial 
rents to fall, in real terms, and the level of value in the commercial sector 
ebbs and flows from place to place. This explains the changes which 
occurred in 1985. In 1978, the changes benefited domestic ratepayers, and 
as a result, domestic rate relief was reduced from 31p to 3p (The relief of 3p 
in 1977-8 was equivalent in terms of the new valuations applicable to 1978-9 
to llp in the pound.) 
According to law in Scotland, a revaluation must take place every five 
years. In 1983, with the agreement of other political parties and COSLA, 
the revaluation was postponed for two years, on the grounds that plans to 
reform the rating system were underway. In fact, the recommendations of 
the 1981 Green Paper (Department of the Environment 1981) suggested 
only minimal change, and the Government proposed the retention of rating 
as the major form of local taxation. <4) 
Whatever the reason, the end result was that revaluation was taking 
place after seven years of fairly traumatic changes in the British economy, 
and it would inevitably reflect those trends. The major change has been the 
rapid decline in manufacturing industry, and by contrast, the growth in the 
service sector and new technology. The rental value of properties will 
change with the capacity of those different sectors to pay, in short, it will 
reflect the operation of supply and demand mechanisms in a mixed 
economy. 
The second related change was the growth of unemployment. Areas 
experiencing high unemployment will likewise have reduced capacity to 
pay rents, and house prices will also be affected. For those in work, 
however, the picture has been somewhat different, and in particular in 
families where the growth of working spouses has led to increased family 
income and aspirations. The demand for home ownership has increased 
and, therefore, the putative 'rental value' of privately owned houses 
relative to the public sector. 
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The end result was inevitably going to be changed tax liabilities for 
many ratepayers. There is also a difference in the basis of the valuation for 
the commercial sector. Housing is valued on the principle of a 'balanced 
market' (the assumption that supply equals demand for housing), whereas 
the value of shops for rating purposes is accordingly governed by a 
straightforward comparison of rents actually paid. 
There has been rapid fluctuation in the level of value of shops, 
particularly with the developments of new shopping centres, which redirect 
the flow of potential value from one part of the town to another' often 
lowering the value of other shops. Revaluation is necessary to reflect this, 
otherwise shops with reduced income will be left with higher values. Shop 
rents themselves vary in the regularity with which rents are fixed, some on 
an annual basis, others on long-term basis. Rents fixed more recently will 
provide a much more accurate basis for reflecting current economic 
conditions as shop rental values reflect location, trading and the flow of 
potential customers. (Sl 
From the official papers, it is clear that the provisional estimates 
showed that rateable value would increase on average by 2.3 times. There 
was, however, a significant range of variation between the four sectors 
(domestic, industrial, commercial, others), with domestic subjects 
increasing by 2.6 times on average and industry by 1. 7 times on average. 
These estimates suggested an increase of 16.5% in the share of total 
rateable value borne by domestic subjects with decreases of 24% for 
industry and freight subjects and 6% for 'other' subjects. 
This prompted the early responses on industrial derating and the 
increase of domestic rate relief. The effect that had on potential increases is 
indicated below, and slight modifications were made to these figures later 
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However, the actual rates increases have also to take into account 
overall changes in grant income and the spending decisions of local 
councils. A COSLA paper produced in March 1985, and based on the 
further increase in the Domestic Rate Relief, local budgets, and the 
reductions in grant, presented the following picture 
TABLE2 
Potential changes in Rating Liabilities of Different Sectors 
Based on budget Decisions of Local Authorities 

















Source: Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. 









As authorities were finalising their budgets in 1985, and as the new 
assessments were being delivered to ratepayers, pressure grew on the 
Government, in the main from Conservative Party supporters, ratepayers 
groups, and small businessmen. During this period, the notion that the 
Government faced widespread electoral disaster in Scotland unless they 
took action to mitigate the effects of revaluation became commonplace, 
and was widely alluded to in the media. For example, the Chairman ofthe 
Scottish Conservative Party, Sir James Goold led the pressure to suspend 
revaluation as "a huge vote loser" ,(Glasgow Herald 23.2.86), and Brian 
Meek, then Conservative Convener of Lothian Region, expanded this 
argument into the issue of wider reforms of local government finance. 
"We should stop tinkering with this unfair system and replace it with 
a more equitable form of local taxation. I cannot recall anything that 
a Tory Government has done that has been so massively unpopular 
as this." (quoted in Glasgow Herald 7.3.85). 
This view was put even more forcibly by Jim O'Neill, former 
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Conservative leader of Renfrew District Council, who predicted that 
revaluation would put a lot of small businesses out of business, and have 
adverse effects for the Conservative Party. 
"I have met many people in the business community who supported 
the party because it backed owner-occupation and small business. 
But with one move they have destroyed the dreams of many. I don't 
think Mr Younger, the Scottish Conservative Party, or the 
Government itself, have any idea of the depth of anger over this 
issue. At future elections there will be a terrible backlash."( quoted in 
The Scotsman 15.3.85) 
What is ironic about all this of course is that the trends in rental value 
merely reflect economic trends in the market. The growth of owner-
occupation and the service sector would inevitably be reflected in tax 
liabilities. And indeed the Government did share many of these 
preconceptions of the political consequences as the subsidies to domestic 
and non-domestic ratepayers show. Public misunderstanding was prevalent 
in the view that the Government was to blame. One senior local 
government officer questioned this view. 
"However misguided such conceptions may have been, Central 
Government decided to retreat in the face of the onslaught and it was 
subsequently announced that an extra £50 million had been found 
which would be made available to stave off the disaster which 
apparently was threatening the credibility of the party in power who 
had evidently assumed responsibility for the outcome of the 
revaluation. This was surprising as such results were quite 
predictable and would have been the same no matter what shade of 
Government had been in St Andrews House or in the House of 
Commons for that matter. Nevertheless, the dice had been cast. "<7l 
There is no doubt that potentially the highest increases were faced by 
the Government's 'natural' supporters, owner-occupiers and small 
businessmen. The highest increases in the domestic sector, where rental 
values had risen three times on average for owner-occupied houses 
compared to 2.6 for all houses, and 2.3 times for Scotland as a whole. This 
was noted in the recent Green Paper. 
"Average movements at the regional level mask even more dramatic 
increases falling on individual ratepayers. The average domestic 
valuation in Scotland increased on revaluation by a multiplier of 
almost 2. 7, but 130,000 Scottish householders faced multipliers of 
38 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1987 
more than three times their previous rateable values." 
Increasing domestic rate relief provided the biggest subsidies to those 
occupying houses with the.highest rateable value. (In short, the subsidy was 
a regressive one.) 
It is also true that some of the highest increases were faced in the 
commercial sector, but it is unclear that job losses would result. One 
Officer questioned this view. 
"Revaluation has not put many small businesses out of business, and 
though it has caused many small businesses to tell the press and me 
that they could be put out of business, but I have yet to see evidence 
of this." 
In his opinion, job losses result from technological changes in retail 
practice rather than simply from revaluation. New shopping centres are 
designed for more efficient profit-making by reducing overheads, and such 
developments have offsetting effects in traditional shopping centres, whose 
retail values will also drop. The matters are interconnected. 
"But on the simpler basis of looking at a retail shop, no case has been 
brought to my attention where a shopkeeper has had to pay off staff 
because his rent or valuation has increased. I can recall one such 
'demonstrative' case, but the very needs of the business involved re-
engagement of staff who had been temporarily laid off." 
Public protest centred around three key themes. 
First, it was argued that revaluation demonstrated that rating was 
unfair and ought to be replaced. 
Second, it was argued that revaluation discriminated against Scottish 
ratepayers vis-a-vis English ratepayers. 
Third, it was widely believed that revaluation caused rates inllreases. 
The third theme does have some credence and will form the third part of 
this paper. The other two themes represent misunderstanding of the system 
by lobbyists, and we will only make a brief comment about each of these. 
The notion that rates are unfair was invoked regularly, both in 
attempts to delay revaluation, and in the pressure mounted for the 
abolition of the rating system. The National Federation of Self Employed 
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and Small Businesses have been powerful and persistent critics of rating's 
unfairness. One of the worst hit areas by revaluation was the Borders 
Region, and their NFSESB spokesman, John Curtis, adopted that line. 
"It must be remembered that rate increases and demands bear no 
relation to the ratepayers' ability to find the money ....... the rating 
system is unfair and completely out of date but, despite election 
promises, the Government has done nothing to introduce alternative 
methods of raising local finance."( quoted in The Scotsman 8.2.85) 
The Scottish Conservative Party Chairman, Sir James Goold, argued 
that the revaluation experience showed that "the rating system, with a 
reducing industrial base and with not all that many people paying rates, is 
not the proper system for financing local government."(quoted in The 
Scotsman 8.2.85) 
Let us now address some of these assumptions. Firstly, we should be 
clear as to the actual impact of revaluation. It does not increase the rating 
income of local authorities, but updates the rateable values to take account 
of changes in inflation and circumstance since the previous revaluation. 
What it does do is alter the balance between ratepayers, and indeed local 
authorities, because it affects their entitlement to rate support grant. Those 
with above average increases in rateable values will have their grant income 
reduced, as the resources element seeks to equalise grant income per penny 
rate poundage, and those with below average incomes will have their grant 
increased. For the small number of authorities who receive no resources 
element, their position is that if they had above average increases in 
rateable value, their tax raising potential is increased (i.e. they can raise 
more for a penny rate) and vice-versa. 
The notion that revaluation demonstrated that rates are an unfair tax is 
mere tautology, for all that revaluation showed was that if you change the 
basis of calculation then you change the outcome in terms of tax liability. 
The mere fact that these changes took place is no more evidence that rates 
are an unfair tax than the previous pattern of tax liabilities were per se. 
The notion that revaluation does not take account of ability to pay is 
only true in a narrow sense. Certainly values ignore income considerations, 
but indirectly, as these are based on comparisons with actual rental and 
property market evidence, the system does so. The Green Paper(8) 
distinguishes between the 'redistributive' and 'beneficial' principles in 
rating. The redistributive principle "sees the value of property as the 
measure of the taxpayer's ability to pay. The ratepayer, in living in a more 
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valuable house than he truly needs, has exercised choice, knowing that one 
of the consequences is an increased tax liability. "(9) 
As noted earlier, the basis of valuing shops for rating purposes is 
governed broadly by a straightforward comparison of rents actually paid. In 
a market economy, one has to assume that the buyer (the renter of the 
property) is willing to assume the consequent rent and rates costs of doing 
so, and if the highest increased values were in sectors and locations 
experiencing relative economic prosperity, it is difficult to see this as 
unfairness. It is possible to argue that there are similarities in principle 
between the income tax system and the rating system, particularly for non-
domestic ratepayers, if income tax is viewed as a share of the profits of 
employment, and rent as an appropriate share of the profits of occupation 
of property. (This view was put to us by a Chartered Surveyor in private 
correspondence). 
In terms of logic, it would be wrong to argue that revaluation showed 
that rating is an unfair system. Those who argued in this way were simply 
transferring their own general criticisms of the rating system per se, to 
revaluation itself. 
The second recurring theme was the notion that revaluation was unfair 
to Scotland vis-a-vis the rest of Britain. Mrs Mary Whitehouse, Chairman 
of the Scottish Ratepayers Federation, made this point frequently in the 
press. Sir James Goold, Scottish Conservative Party Chairman, used this 
argument when calling for the suspension of revaluation, as "it 
demonstrates the way in which Scotland suffers, whilst England does not." 
More expectedly, Donald Stewart MP, President of the SNP, also calling 
for revaluation to be shelved, stated that revaluation continued the 
Government's policy of direct discrimination against Scotland, using Scots 
"as guinea pigs for measures which would be unacceptable in the Tory 
shires or the Home Counties."(quoted in The Scotsman 6.4.85). By 
contrast, John Davidson, of the Scottish CBI, believed that revaluation had 
gone some way to rectifying imbalance between industrial/commercial 
rates and domestic rates, whilst arguing that industry and commerce still 
pay more than similar interests in England. 
Again, there are serious problems with these assumptions. It is 
certainly the case that there has been no revaluation in England since 1973. 
In part this is for technical reasons. With the growth of owner-occupation, 
and the decline of the private rented sector, it was stated in the Layfield 
Report of 1976 that the point had been reached in England and Wales 
where enough rental evidence to support another revaluation of domestic 
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properties on a rental basis would not be available.<10l A recent study 
argued that only 1. 7% of private dwellings in the Borders Region had rents 
which were useable for valuation purposes. (II) However, this study wrongly 
ignored the public rented sector. 
There are problems of comparing the outcomes of the two systems, as 
they are based on different principles. And the data does not exist to allow a 
comprehensive comparative analysis of the tax liabilities of non-domestic 
ratepayers North and South of the border. 
Certainly, the selectivity exercised by pressure groups for purposes of 
political lobbying (e.g. Celtic and Manchester United, or Frasers and 
Harrods) provides no sound basis for conclusions. In terms of domestic 
ratepayers, there is consistent evidence of higher average rates in England 
vis-a-vis Scotland, both per house and as a proportion of average 
incomes. (IZ) There are reasons for expecting this to be the case. Scotland 
has a higher level of central government support for local government 
finance than in England. England has a higher level of owner- occupation, 
with consequent higher rateable values, and thus higher rates. 
As the two systems have different principles, it is wrong to assume that 
an English revaluation would settle what real anomalies do occur anyway. 
Only when a uniform system of valuation is introduced will this be so. What 
has to be clear, however, is that a revaluation in England would have no 
direct impact on rates in Scotland, nor vice versa. A revaluation in England 
would lead to some ratepayers paying more and others less, and in all 
probability, to use an American analogy, a shift in grant resources from the 
English "sun belt", the prosperous South and South East, to the English 
"frost belt", the industrial North. 
The 1981 White Paper Alternatives to Domestic Rates predicted that 
an English revaluation would have the following shifts: 
(a) Larger, older labour intensive industries in the Midlands and the 
North would have their relative rate burdens substantially reduced. 
(b) Newer steelworks, local shops and older offices would receive a slight 
reduction. 
(c) New offices and small factories on modern industrial estates would be 
slightly increased. 
(d) Shops in primary locations and modern oil refineries would be 
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substantially increased. 
These are similar to the changes which occurred in Scotland. As a 
result, the political consequences for the Government could be more 
dramatic than in Scotland if a revaluation now took place in England. This 
does not conceal the fact that rates are lower in the South and higher in the 
North than they would be if revaluation took place. Whatever the position 
in England, apart from industries in direct competition, (i.e. not Frasers 
and Harrods) it is difficult to find any serious argument that revaluation was 
discrimination against Scotland as a whole. This would only be so if all 
Scottish ratepayers paid more as a result of the revaluation (which they do 
not) and as a result paid more for the same level of service as in England. 
What is surprising is the lack of knowledge of the system by political or 
pressure group activists seeking to affect change. One would have thought a 
sound knowledge of how the current system works is a necessary 
prerequisite to informed advocacy of change and reform. 
Analysing the Impact of Revaluation on Rates 
We have already stressed that revaluation does not increase the rating 
burden as a whole. It does, however, have relative effects between 
ratepayers and areas. We cannot examine detailed and individual cases, 
and whilst we know that, in general, industrial ratepayers gained and 
domestic ratepayers lost, and others were broadly neutral, there will always 
be exceptions to those general trends because of peculiar local 
circumstances. Ratepayers do not pay 'national' rates, so knowing the 
broad shifts for Scotland as a whole are only indicative. 
The proportions of rateable value paid by the different classes of 
ratepayer varies between authorities, so one would expect any relative 
effect of revaluation on rates to vary also. There are two ways of analysing 
this effect. One is by suing direct measures of the change in rateable values. 
Table 3 below shows the wide range of changes incurred across Scotland 
within the total overall changes which ranged from 1.4 to 2.7. 
TABLE3 







1.3 to 3.4 
1.5to3.6 
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We can see the range is considerable. It may well be, however, that 
such indicators have a varied effect on rates. For example, an authority 
which had a high increase of rateable values for its industrial ratepayers, but 
which sector provided only a small proportion of its rateable income, would 
have a different effect from an authority with the same degree of increase 
but where that same sector accounted for a higher proportion of its rateable 
values. We know also that these proportions vary considerably between 
authorities. For example, Table 4 sets out the variations in domestic as a 
proportion of total income. 
TABLE4 
Domestic as a Proportion of Total Rateable Income 
















We have therefore constructed three measures which reflect the 
pattern of change nationally. If we are looking for explanations of 
variations in the effect of revaluation between authorities, then we know to 
concentrate on measures relative to the two classes of ratepayer where the 
most significant overall changes took place, namely domestic and industrial 
ratepayers. 
We have suggested two indicators to take account of the effect of 
industrial decline. The first is simply the percentage of industrial rateable 
value in the total of rateable value. With the decline in industrial values, 
authorities with high proportions of industrial ratepayers will have greatly 
reduced rateable income which could affect the amount which needs to be 
raised in rates from other sectors within the authority, and may well bring 
them into the resources element and affect other authorities. Secondly, we 
propose using a simple measure of population density as industrial decline 
is thought to be greatest in urban areas. 
The final problem is the choice of a dependent variable. We have 
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already argued that revaluation does not in itself increase local authority 
expenditure, but what it does change is the rateable and grant income of 
authorities. As the greatest overall increase was faced by domestic 
ratepayer~, we have chosen the % growth in average domestic rate bill as 
the domestic variable as this will vary directly with the effect of revaluation. 
The average domesticrate bill in Scotland grew by 19.5% in 1985-6, (after 
account is taken of selective action to reduce the rate in the City of 
Edinburgh). 
We tested the relationship of these variables using the statistical 
technique of regression analysis. When used in data analysis, this is a 
versatile statistical procedure employed for exploring and testing the 
relationship between a dependent variable and a set of independent 
variables. The technique can be used to quantify the strength and nature of 
relationships among certain variables while controlling the effect of other 
variables in the regression formula. The statistical relationship between 
variables is .sought in a linear model ofprediction.lt can, therefore, identify 
general relationships. It cannot be used for the explanation of features 










Population Density 0.487*** 
* = Significant at .05 level 
** =Significant at .Ollevel 














The first stage of the analysis was simply the production of simple 
correlations, as set out in Table 5. It provides some statistical support for 
the hypotheses framed earlier, with one spectacular exception. The 
strongest correlation found was between population density and the 
average domestic rate increase. So whilst the simple correlations suggest 
that no general relationship exists between the percentage of commercial 
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and the percentage of domestic rate increase, its close association with 
population density suggests that it was in urban residential and commercial 
centres that the greatest impact of revaluation was felt and that population 
density is not a surrogate 'for industrialisation as expected. We know that 
high increases occurred in residential Bearsden and Eastwood for instance, 
and the big commercial cities such as Aberdeen, Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
Importantly, there was a negative relationship (as expected) with the 
surrogate for industrial decline (percentage of rateable value for industrial 
ratepayers). In fact, the areas most likely to benefit from revaluation were 
areas of traditional Labour Party control. 
There are obvious problems of multi-collinearity with the data. That 
is, simple correlations do not isolate completely the explanatory power of 
specific variables. For example, areas with a high dependence on domestic 
rateable income are also closely associated with high levels of income from 
commercial ratepayers. 
We pursued this further by entering the variables into a stepwise, 
multiple regression, a technique for isolating the effects of individual 
variables and identifying those variables with the strongest explanatory 
power. That is, the analysis selects those variables most strongly associated 
with the dependent variable, the percentage increase in the average 
domestic rate payment. 
The empirical findings confirm our theory. Population density was 
selected first, and explained 23% of the variance. The second variable 
selected was the percentage of rateable values raised by industrial 
ratepayers, and the relationship, as expected, was a negative one. This 
second variable added only a further 6% to the variance explained. 
TABLE6 
Stepwise Regression on Effect of Revaluation 
on the Average Domestic Rates Payment 
Variable 
Population Density 
% Industrial in Rateable 
Values 
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None of the other variables adds any further explanations to those two 
variables, and are therefore rejected by the computer. This provides partial 
confirmation of our hypotheses. Areas with high proportions of industrial 
ratepayers are areas of relative economic decline, and this has been 
reflected in the movement of rental levels, and thus of rateable values. 
They would therefore receive additional resources element grant and, 
assuming no change in spending or grant levels, this would result in lower 
domestic rate payments than in residential areas. However, in the real 
world of local politics, changes in grant and spending occur as local 
authorities react to changes in their financial, social, economic and political 
context. Moreover, as we saw, less than 30% of the variance in increases in 
domestic rate payments were directly attributable to revaluation. 
We can explore the issue further by widening the analysis to include 
other factors unaffected by revaluation, by seeking to explain changes in 
rateborne expenditure. Revaluation does not affect rate borne expenditure 
for local government as a whole. What it changes is the balance of 
contributions between classes of ratepayer and local authority area. We 
have already examined the effect of changes between classes of ratepayers 
on authorities. What matters here is the changes in revaluation overall. 
Authorities with high increases in rateable values will have consequent 
decreases in the resources element of the Rate Support Grant. In some 
cases, where authorities do not receive resources element, high 
revaluations would represent real growth in the financial raising capacity of 
a penny rate, and potential real growth in income to authorities (e.g. 
Grampian Region where the growth was above the Scottish average). 
Table 7 below sets out the changes in valuations for regional and island 
authorities. In the case of Orkney and Shetland, neither of whom receive 
resources element, revaluation resulted in a real loss of income per penny 
rate product, and this reflects the high proportion of non-domestic rateable 
income. 
A similar picture emerged for districts where the range of changes 
varied from 2.1 to 2. 7. Significantly, the highest increases overall were in 
areas where the Conservative Party is electorally strong. These were, 
Berwickshire (2.7), and Ettrick and Lauderdale, Roxburgh, Annandale 
and Eskdale, Kincardine and Deeside, Moray, Eastwood, Angus, and 
Perth and Kinross (all 2.6). In Eastwood, and Perth and Kinross District, 
the local Conservative MPs received considerable flak for the effect of both 
revaluation and government grant decisions on rates. The decision about 
absolute levels of grant would also affect the capaCity of the resources 
element to compensate for relative changes in rateable income resulting 
from revaluation. 
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TABLE7 





























In this instance we will use the % change in ratebome expenditure as a 
measure of changes in local taxation, as the use of rate poundages would be 
complicated by the effect on poundages by revaluation. That is, the amount 
raised for a penny rate rose by 2.3 times in Scotland as a whole as a result of 
revaluation, thereby reducing the rate poundages fixed by authorities. 
One variable likely to impact on rateborne expenditure is: percentage 
change in the needs element of the Rate Support Grant, the sum of money 
provided by central government as being indicative of need to spend. In 
1985, the government decided to alter radically the balance of this grant 
between regions and districts, and whereas the total amount available to 
regional services fell by 1.86% (in part because of the increase in domestic 
rate relief), the sums available to districts fell by 27.83%. The effect ofthis 
is a cosmetic one, the intention being to increase the grant contribution to 
major services and assist more equitable use of grant between regional, 
therefore having very minimal impact on actual rates payments. But the 
effect of these changes needs to be isolated and controlled to examine the 
effects of revaluation on rateborne expenditure. 
The next variable is the percentage change in the resources element, 
which is the direct result of revaluation. Some regions and islands get no 
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changed that. 
For both the foregoing factors, we would assume a relationship that 
the greater the grant loss, the greater the increase in rateborne 
expenditure. 
The third factor resulting from the decisions of the Secretary of State is 
current. expenditure guidelines. Each year central government issues 
current expenditure guidelines to authorities to assist in their financial 
planning. Although described as indicative, these guidelines are crucial 
features of the penalty and rate-capping mechanisms. Guidelines are based 
on two sets of calculations. The first is the client group assessments of 
expenditure need, which form the basis of both guidelines and the 
distribution of the needs grant. The second is the operation of a safety net 
mechanism whereby assessments of need are adjusted to reflect past 
expenditure patterns. That is, authorities who would require to make 
dramatic savings to reach these assessments have them adjusted closer to 
their last year's budget in order to provide a more attainable guideline. The 
converse is also true. 
Since the guidelines became linked to the penalty (or general 
abatement) system, the pressure to conform to them has increased. Indeed, 
some authorities whose needs assessment was growing lobbied hard to have 
the scale of the secondary adjustment modified to give greater prominence 
to the client group assessments in 1985-6. We have used % growth in 
guidelines as a potential explanatory variable. 
We now turn to local factors. The first of these is simply the revaluation 
multiplier for each authority. It too, like the decisions of the Secretary of 
State, is a given. It does not in itself lead to changes in rateborne 
expenditure, but it can seriously constrain the choice. For example, an 
authority with a growing rateable income could choose either to use it to 
promote growth in spending, or reduce local taxation levels, whereas an 
authority with falling levels of income is less fortunate, dependent upon 
where it stands vis-a-vis its guidelines. So it could choose to increase its 
overall level to compensate for loss of income, or reduce spending, or some 
combination of these. At any rate, the key point is that the effect of 
revaluation would not be mechanical, but rather one of constrained choice. 
The second variable relates to existing spending. Rateborne 
expenditure will be increased or reduced dependent upon the availability of 
unspent balances or accrued deficit in the previous year. The application of 
balances will reduce the level of rateborne expenditure, and rating for 
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deficits will increase it. The variable used is the percentage change in 
balances/deficits. 
Government ministers continually insisted that a major cause of 
increased rates was local 'overspending'. The Scottish Secretary stressed 
this, even after he announced the subsidies to both domestic and non-
domestic ratepayers. 
"We are in no doubt that there are many in Scotland who even after 
the new rebates will continue to face hefty rates increases this year, 
especially in areas where the local authorities have been less than 
responsible in budgeting." (speech to the House of Commons, 
3.6.85) 
We have included three variables which reflect local spending 
decisions. One is the percentage change in net expenditure (that financed 
by grant and rates) with the expectation that higher increases than 
suggested by the RSG settlement will lead to higher rate borne expenditure. 
A second indicator is the degree of excess above current expenditure 
guidelines. 
Thirdly, there is a widespread assumption that Labour-controlled 
councils are "high spenders". Our own view is that this is an over-
simplification, and whilst we would accept that in terms of political 
philosophy one would expect Labour to be more favourably disposed to 
local spending than the Conservatives, the Labour Party has a wide 
diversity of philosophy and practice with regard to local government (as 
with other areas of public policy). From our own research, we are aware of 
several Labour authorities which exhibit great concern for rate levels and 
the avoidance of rate-capping. 
The variable we have used is simply Labour control. This is consistent 
with previous academic research(B), which argues that it is the fact of party 
control of the council which matters rather than the size of the majority. We 
have assumed therefore that Labour councils would be more prone to 
increase spending than either Conservative, Independent, or hung 
councils, and that the one authority controlled by the SNP would not be of 
statistical significance anyway. Our detailed knowledge of that authority 
(Angus) is such that we are aware of that Group's concern for fiscal 
prudence and in fact it met the government guidelines in 1985-6. 
We have again examined these factors in two stages. Table 9 sets out 
the simple correlations found and reveals some strong associations. There 
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is a negative correlation (-0.565) between Labour Party control and the 
revaluation multiplier. This confirms our previous findings that the areas of 
economic prosperity did have the expected higher valuations with adverse 
political consequences for the government. 
In terms of explaining variations in rateborne expenditure, the 
strongest association was with growth in spending (0.552) and secondly, 
with the revaluation multiplier (0.492). Both of these are consistent with 
the government view that revaluation and spending growth were important 
factors. What is perhaps unexpected is the strong negative relationship 
between Labour control and both growth in rate borne expenditure and net 
expenditure. If authorities were being "less than responsible in their 
budgeting", then these do not seem to have been Labour controlled 
authorities. 
Further examination shows the availability of balances to be quite 
strongly associated with growth in spending. Loss of needs grant is also 
related to growth in rateborne expenditure (the financing decision), though 
not to growth in net expenditure (the spending decision). 
Some of these findings are really quite important. Already it appears 
that changes in income had a much greater effect on the financing decision 
of local authorities than the expenditure decisions. There are only two 
significant relationships identified with growth in spending. Budgeting to 
spend above guidelines is strongly related (0.649), which is not surprising, 
as guidelines now reflect past spending, but the real surprise again is the 
negative relationship between Labour control and spending growth. 
Labour councils lost needs grant, and gained resources grant in 1985-6, but 
these appear to have had little impact on the spending decision. 
Importantly, however, although guidelines growth had no impact on either 
the spending or the financing decision overall, it was weakly negatively 
associated with Labour control, and suggests Labour councils were 
constrained by this because of its implication for grant penalties. 
As expected there was a negative relationship between the revaluation 
multiplier and the change in resources grant. There was no relationship at 
all between the needs grant and the revaluation multiplier. This can be 
interpreted as demonstrating that those authorities with the most buoyant 
local economies had less need to spend on local public services. 
Again, many of these factors are interrelated, so we sought to isolate 
the effects through stepwise multiple regression. 31% of the variance in 
rateborne expenditure was attributable to growth in spending, 23% due to 
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changes in the availability of balances from the previous year (i.e. rating for 
·spending previously funded from balances) 9% was negatively related to 
growth in expenditure need (as reflected in the needs grant) and 10% 
because of revaluation. In total these four variables explain 73% of the 
growth in rateborne expenditure, and all the other variables tested are 
rejected. 
TABLE9 
Explanations of Change in Rateborne Expenditure 
Variable 
Growth in Spending 
Availability of Balances 













Revaluation did have considerable impact on the tax liabilities of 
individual ratepayers. Domestic ratepayers as a whole paid more, 
commercial ratepayers approximately the same (with greater variations) 
and industrial ratepayers paid less. 
Its relative effects between authorities were minimal in comparison to 
other factors. In general, industrial areas with high levels of public housing 
gained central government resources from the changes. Areas of 
traditional Conservative support lost grant, and had higher rates increases 
as a result. 
Whilst the spending decisions of local authorities were important, so 
also was the effect of changes in available balances perhaps because these 
were heavily used in 1984 to keep down district rates in the election year. 
Labour party control, contrary to expectations, proved unimportant. 
Labour councils were less likely in 1985-6 to finance higher spending, 
perhaps because of potential grant penalties. Other councils appear to have 
been less concerned about penalties and guidelines. 
So whilst revaluation could be crucial in determining individual rates 
bills, its significance was much less in explaining rates increases between 
local authorities. As the biggest effect was on domestic ratepayers in 
general, and private house owners in particular, the political problems for 
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the government were considerable. The more exaggerated claims about 
revaluation have little substance. Revaluation did not prove that Scotland 
was suffering vis-a-vis England, nor that rating is an unfair system. Indeed, 
the provision of additional grant for areas of social and economic decline 
has been a direct consequence of revaluation, and one which would not 
have occurred without it. In England, this problem can only be overcome 
by a revaluation, but this will not happen in the lifetime of the present 
Parliament. 
Arthur Midwinter is senior lecturer in administration at Strathclyde 
Business School, and Director of the School's Public Sector Management 
Unit. 
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